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Technology overview 
 
The iron and steel sector consumes about 19% of global final energy use and accounts for 
a quarter of direct CO2 emissions from industry and roughly 4.5% of global CO2 emissions 
(WSA 2008a). Steel production is very energy intensive with 20% to 40% of the cost of steel 
production derived from energy expenses (WSA 2008a). On average every ton of primary steel 
produced in a blast furnace results in one-and-a-half to two tons of direct CO2 emissions in 
OECD countries (ArcelorMittal 2008). The energy efficiency of steelmaking facilities differ 
greatly depending on production route, type of iron ore and coal used, the steel product mix, 
operation control technology, and material efficiency (WSA 2008b). 
 
The promise of large CO2 emission reduction in the steel sector lies in two directions. 
One is to accelerate the penetration of currently available energy efficiency technologies. The 
other is to find breakthrough technologies. The best steel mills are now limited by the laws of 
thermodynamics in how much they can still improve their energy efficiency. For these plants, 
further large reductions in CO2 emissions are not possible using current technologies. A portfolio 
of breakthrough technologies will therefore be required to meet the CO2 emission standard called 
for by governments and international institutes (WSA 2008a). Many regional initiatives are 
being undertaken to identify technologies that hold the promise of large reductions in CO2 
emissions and to explore their feasibility at various scales from lab work, to pilot plant 
development, and eventually to commercial implementation. The central players include the EU 
Ultra-low CO2 Steelmaking Project,1 the American Iron and Steel Institute, the Canadian Steel 
Federation, ArcelorMittal Brazil, the Japanese Iron and Steel Federation, the Korean POSCO, 
China’s Baosteel, and Australia’s Bluescope (WSA 2008b). 
 
Among the portfolio of breakthrough technologies, the coal-based iron-making 
technologies associated with carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology are the most likely 
candidates for early maturity. Hydrogen and electrolysis are being explored by the European 
Union and the United States. Hydrogen could be used as a reducing agent, as its oxidation 
produces only water. Hydrogen—either pure, as a syngas produced by reforming methane, or as 
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natural gas—can be used in conventional direct-reduction reactors or in more futurist flash 
reactors. Electrolysis can be used to generate the reducing agents. They are provided either by 
electricity, for which the corresponding process is the electrolysis of iron ore, or by bacteria. 
Biomass solutions are probably in the intermediate future. Integrating steelmaking with solar 
power generation or with new energy technologies may be on the horizon in the longer term.   
 
Where does China stand? 
 
 Steel production accounted for nearly 17% of China’s primary energy use in 2008. 
Compared to developed countries’ steel producers, China’s steel sector has much higher primary 
energy intensity (Figure 11). This higher intensity can be explained by heavy reliance on coal, 
relatively higher iron alloy production, lower waste energy recovery, smaller scale of equipment, 
lower conversion efficiency of steam and oxygen, and relatively poor material quality (Huang 
2008; Tsinghua Study 2009). Figure 12 show high pig-iron versus crude steel ratio in China. 
According to a Japanese study, in 2005 China could have reduced CO2 emissions by 180 million 
tons per year by increasing its steel sector’s national average energy efficiency to match Japan’s 
(Yamaguchi 2005). 
 
                          Figure 11. World steel sector energy intensity index by region, 2005 
                       
                        Source: Japan Iron and Steel Federation, 2005 
                                                    
                              Figure 12. Pig-iron vs. crude steel ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                      
                                 Source: Huang, 2008 
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China is keenly aware of its efficiency issues. The 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) 
mandated that the steel sector’s energy efficiency should improve 20% between 2006 and 2010. 
From 2006 to 2008 the sector’s per GDP energy consumption was respectively reduced by 1.8%, 
3.7%, and 4.2%. This fell short of the goal but shows an accelerating improvement. A key factor 
in the efficiency improvement was the closure of small inefficient mills. In May 2007 the NDRC 
released a list of outdated iron and steel mills to be closed by 2010. According to the list, an 
estimated 42 million tons of steel-making capacity would be closed down each year. 
 
Shutting small mills alone will be insufficient to reach China’s energy efficiency target 
and the global standards for energy intensity in China’s steel sector and to reduce the steel 
sector’s demand on the energy infrastructure. To further improve its energy efficiency in the 
steel sector, China needs to catch up with the rest of the world in steel-making technology. The 
existing technological frontier of steel production has little room to grow (WSA 2009a), but the 
Chinese steel sector can absorb, deploy, and diffuse preexisting but new-to-China technologies.  
 
 
       Table 12. China’s categorization of energy efficiency technologies  
Tier 1 
Fully adopted and 
diffused 
Mini-pellet sintering technology 
Recovering waste heat from sintering circulating cooler to produce steam, 
hot air sintering technology 
Low-temperature sintering technology 
The electric precipitator for removing dust at the head of sintering 
machine technology 
Deep-bed sintering and sintering bedding technology 
Remove dust recycling technology 
Top-pressure recovery turbine technology (TRT) 
Blast furnace pulverized coal injection technology (PCI) 
Coke oven gas HPF desulphurization technology  
Stove dual preheating technology 
Efficient continuous casting technology 
Boiler combusts all blast furnace gas technology 
Highly preheated air combustion technology 
Technology of hot conveyance and loading of successive casting 
Tier 2 
Partially adopted 
Coke dry quenching technology (CDQ) 
Generating power by sintering waste heat technology 
Dry dusting in blast furnace technology 
Converter gas dry dedusting technology 
Lengthen service campaign by slag splashing in combined blown 
converter technology 
Clean steel production system optimization technology 
Iron and steel plants energy management center 
Tier 3 
To be transferred 
Combined cycle power plant (CCPP) 
Sintering flue gas circulation technology 
Coal moisture control technology (CMC) 
Sintering activated coke desulphurization technology  
COREX smelting reduction in iron making technology 
     Source: Tsinghua Study 2009 
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Technology transfer therefore plays a crucial role in the government’s plans to reduce 
energy intensity. It categorizes steel energy efficiency technologies into three tiers based on the 
existing level of technology transfer and deployment. The first tier includes technologies that 
have been transferred, absorbed, and even domestically innovated. The second tier covers 
technologies that have been transferred and partly absorbed, but with limited deployment. The 
last tier consists of technologies that haven’t been transferred (Table 12).  
 
How was advanced efficiency technology transferred to and deployed in China? 
 
In the first 30 years of China’s history, its steel sector focused exclusively on producing 
more steel to meet the demands of a country with growing industry. The 1st Five-Year Plan 
(1953–1957) established a blueprint for the development of China’s steel industry. The plan 
proposed to build “3 large, 5 medium and 18 small-scale steel plants” across China. The former 
Soviet Union provided major aid for the construction of new plants and retrofitting of old plants. 
Accordingly, China’s steelmaking technologies were deeply influenced by the former Soviet 
Union where many Chinese leaders and technicians received training in running steel plants.  
 
Energy efficiency technology was not a focus of the steel sector until the late 1970s when 
China opened its doors to the world. In 1978 the vice minister of China’s Ministry of 
Metallurgical Industry (MMI) led the China Metallurgical Industry Association on a study tour 
in Japan. After the tour, the vice minister submitted a report to the State Council. The report 
summarized Japan’s development in steelmaking and pointed out that Japan was eager to sell its 
steelmaking technologies and equipments to China due to the global recession. The report 
suggested that China’s steel sector take advantage of this opportunity by importing Japanese 
technologies and equipment, including energy efficiency technologies. China’s domestic energy 
shortage made this proposal more convincing and attractive. Two months after the tour, a 
Japanese delegation led by the CEO of Nippon Steel Corporation visited Beijing. Former 
Chinese Vice Premier, Li Xiangnian met the delegation with two requests. One was to help build 
a large steel plant in Shanghai, which became the core of BaoSteel. The other was to seek 
technology supports, namely to help the Chinese state-owned steel sector upgrade its backward 
steelmaking technologies. 
 
These two visits inaugurated the long-term cooperation between China and Japan in the 
steel sector. Based on its experience of developing an advanced industrial economy with limited 
energy resources, Japan emphasizes energy efficiency and conservation not only domestically 
but also overseas (Ohshita 2008). As a result, Japan’s cooperation with China in the steel sector 
has focused on energy efficiency from the very beginning. Through technology demonstration, 
project-type technical assistance, and training, Japan has played an important role in advancing 
China’s efficiency technology in steelmaking. 
 
The Blast Furnace Top Gas Recovery Turbine Unit (TRT, see Box 3) is a tier one 
technology in China’s categorization today (Table 12). Its transfer highlights how efficiency 
technology was adapted, deployed, and defused in China. TRT technologies originated in Europe 
but developed and matured in Japan. Mitsui, Hitachi, and Kawasaki are the global leaders in 
R&D and manufacture of TRT technologies. As early as 1996 all blast furnaces in Japan were  
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Source: UNEP/GEF, Energy Efficiency Technologies Knowledge Base (EET KB), 2010 
 
 
equipped with TRT. This innovation partly explains why the Japanese steel sector boasts the best 
energy efficiency in the world.  
 
The Blast Furnace Top Gas Recovery Turbine Unit (TRT, see Box 3) is a tier one 
technology in China’s categorization today (Table 12). Its transfer highlights how efficiency 
technology was adapted, deployed, and defused in China. TRT technologies originated in Europe 
but developed and matured in Japan. Mitsui, Hitachi, and Kawasaki are the global leaders in 
R&D and manufacture of TRT technologies. As early as 1996 all blast furnaces in Japan were 
Box 3. What is Blast Furnace Top Gas Recovery Turbine Unit (TRT)? 
 
Blast Furnace Top Gas Recovery Turbine Unit (TRT) is an energy-saving equipment 
used for a blast furnace of a steel plant. Average blast furnace gas has a pressure of 
0.2-0.236MPa (2-2.41kg/cm2) and temperature of approximately 2000C at the furnace 
top. TRT technology is a method of generating power by employing this heat and 
pressure to drive a turbine-generator. The system comprises ash collecting equipment, 
a gas turbine, and a generator. Generating methods are classified as wet and dry, 
depending on the blast furnace gas purification method. Ash is removed by Venturi 
scrubbers in the wet method and by a dry-type ash collector in the dry method. When 
ash is treated by the dry method, the gas temperature drop is small in comparison with 
the wet method, and as a result, generated output is at maximum 1.6 times greater than 
with the wet method. 
Energy Saving Effects  
Improvement 
effect 
Generating capacity 
(kW) 
7000 
(approx.) 
Reduction of 
energy 
consumption 
Annual generated 
output (GWh) 
55.4 
(approx.) 
Reduction in crude oil 
equivalent (t-crude 
oil/y) 
14669 
(approx.) 
Note: assume pig iron production of 1 million t/y and dry-type TRT 
Investment Cost and Economic Evaluation: 
Investment cost Equipment cost: $4 million 
Construction cost: $4 million 
Generating capacity: 7MW 
Economic 
evaluation 
Economic effect $9.9 million/year 
Years to recoup investment 
• Equipment only 
• Including construction cost 
 
1.4 years 
1.8 years 
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equipped with TRT. This innovation partly explains why the Japanese steel sector boasts the best 
energy efficiency in the world.  
 
Feasibility studies are often the first step of technology import in China. China’s National 
Science and Technology Plan—the Medium to Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science 
& Technology—for example, requires an assessment of all imported technologies to evaluate 
whether China has the capacity to absorb and deploy the technology. Contingent on the type of 
imported technology, a specific Chinese government agency is assigned to undertake the 
feasibility study.  
 
China started a feasibility study on TRT in 1978, following the initial study tour to Japan. 
The MMI organized a group of experts from major steel plants and universities to conduct the 
study. The result of the study, delivered in 1981, was that China’s steel sector should import 
TRT technologies as soon as possible because of TRT’s clear economic benefits and ease of 
installation.   
 
In 1982 Beijing Capital Steel and Shanghai BaoSteel first purchased two wet-type TRT 
units from Japan. Later more steel plants imported TRTs, either wet- or dry-type, from Japanese 
suppliers (Tsinghua Study 2009). Most of these purchases were market actions without 
government involvement. These market-driven technology imports, however, did not lead to 
absorption and deployment. The causes of this failure were two-fold: Japanese technology 
providers didn’t provide know-how to the Chinese companies; and Chinese companies didn’t 
have the capacity to reverse-engineer the technology without government support.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ohshita 2008; METI website 
Box 4. Japan’s Green Aid Plan 
Japan’s Green Aid Plan (GAP) was created in 1992. It is led by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry (METI) and implemented by the New Energy Development Organization (NEDO), 
Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), and the Energy Conservation Center, Japan (ECCJ), 
as well as Japanese technology providers. A distinguishing characteristic of GAP is that it enabled 
METI to engage in policy dialogues with governments in developing countries. The plan has a 
strong focus on China. Between 1992 and 2002, 18 out of 35 energy efficiency technology 
demonstration projects were carried out in China. And nine of the 18 projects were conducted in 
Chinese iron and steel enterprises. 
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Responding to the slow uptake of TRT technology, China and Japan launched the 
Panzhihua Demonstration Project, under Japan’s Green Aid Plan (GAP, see Box 4). In 1994 
NEDO signed the Panzhihua TRT Technologies Demonstration Project Agreement, with China’s 
State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) and MMI. The agreement commissioned 
Kawasaki Steel Corporation and the Panzhihua Steel Corporation to jointly design, construct, 
and install China’s first wet and dry dual-use TRT device. Kawasaki was responsible for initial 
design and provided TRT units, including the main engine, bag filter, control instrument system, 
and valves to China. Panzhihua was tasked with construction, pipe installment, and 
operation/maintenance. The project started installation in February 1997. Exactly one year later 
the TRT facility successfully went into operation. The project’s annual generation capacity is 35 
GWh (Tsinghua Study 2009). The total investment of the project was 86 million Yuan (US$11 
million in 1998 dollars), of which Japan provided 60 million Yuan and the remainder came from 
China. 
 
The collaboration between the two governments played a key role in the technology 
transfer. On the Japanese end, the government made two key contributions: (1) It directly 
provided funding to Kawasaki to cover the cost of equipment and trainings; and (2) It carried out 
a series of preparation steps and follow-up activities to insure the success of Panzhihua 
Demonstration Project (Figure 13). Follow-up activities such as informational seminars and 
training workshops played a key role in facilitating the transfer of the demonstrated TRT 
technologies to Chinese experts.  
 
     Figure 13. Japanese government’s involvement in the Panzhihua Demonstration Project 
 
• Surveyed a number 
of steel plants and 
finally chose 
Panzhihua
Site selection
• Examined 
Panzhihua’s sinters, 
coke ovens, blast 
furnace and converter 
facilities, etc
Facility 
examination • Assessed Panzhihua’s
human capacity
Human capital 
evaluation
• Hosted informational 
seminars and training 
workshops to 
showcase the TRT 
technology
Follow-up 
activities
 
 
 
The Chinese government also actively participated in the process as well. At the national 
level the SDPC and MMI engaged in the policy dialogue with MITI on the technology and site 
selections. These agencies also authorized Sichuan Provincial and Panzhihua municipal 
governments to establish the project as a strategic priority for regional development. This 
authorization ensured political and financial support from the local governments. In addition to 
the government-to-government collaboration, industry associations from both countries also 
played a supportive role. The Japanese Iron and Steel Federation (JISF) and China Iron & Steel 
Association (CISA) hosted large gatherings of iron and steel companies in both countries to 
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exchange ideas and promote technology transfer (JISF 2010). Figure 14 demonstrates the 
collaboration scheme between the two sides. 
 
        Figure 14. China-Japan collaboration in the Panzhihua steel TRT demonstration project 
 
 
                Source: Ohshita 2008 
 
Following the project, the Chinese government took several steps to nurture the TRT 
innovation cycle. First they identified two Chinese companies, Shanxi Glower Group (SGG) and 
AVIC Chengdu Engine Group (ACEG), to decode the technology, and the government 
financially supported the two companies’ learning activities. In the early 1990s, the SDPC and 
Economic and Trade Commission (ETC) listed TRT as one of four key technologies that needed 
to be quickly diffused and thus it was entitled to a government grant.  
 
In 2003, the NDRC mandated that all blast furnaces with a pressure over 130 kilopascals 
(kPa) should install TRT. This was also written in a regulation published by the NDRC in 2004. 
The mandate created a huge domestic market for TRT units. In 2006 the S&T National Plan 
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further incentivized domestic firms to pursue made-in-China energy efficiency technologies 
through tax credits. This policy effectively stimulated domestic demand for made-in-China TRT. 
Finally, in response to the 11th Five-Year Plan, the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) published in 2007 the Blueprint for TRT Technologies Diffusion, which 
highlights the priority and potential of future TRT deployments. 
 
These measures taken by the Chinese government effectively induced the deployment 
and diffusion of TRT technologies. SGG and ACEG have not only decoded the TRT technology, 
but also re-innovated the technology to fit China’s specific needs. For example, most Chinese 
blast furnaces are smaller and less efficient than Japanese furnaces. SGG designed and 
manufactured dry-type TRTs that fit blast furnace smaller than 1000 m3 in order to meet this 
need. This re-innovation greatly boosted the diffusion rate of TRT among China’s small-scale 
steel plants.  
 
By the end of 2008, China had manufactured over 400 TRT units, which led to a nearly 
80% TRT installation rate among blast furnaces in China. These TRT facilities generated a total 
of 8852 GWh of electricity in 2008 (Table 13), creating huge economic and environmental 
benefits. The Blueprint for TRT Technologies Diffusion laid out the priorities for China’s future 
diffusion: retrofitting current wet-type TRT into the more efficient dry-type TRT and reaching a 
100% installation rate among all the large blast furnaces (≥3000 m3). Currently over one-third of 
China’s TRTs are wet-type. By converting these into dry-type, electricity generation will 
increase 10 kWh per ton iron. This leads to an increase of annual generation capacity at 1158 
GWh, saving 0.38 million tons of coal a year. China also plans to invest 1.05 billion Yuan 
(US$157 million) to build and install 17 dry-type TRTs at 10 large-scale steel plants in the next 
five years. Their installed capacity will be 219 MW.  
 
Table 13. TRT installation rate among China’s blast furnaces, 2008 
Blast 
furnace 
Volume ≥3000m3 2000–
2999 m3 
1000–
1999 m3 
300–999 
m3 
<300m3 Total 
Number 27 52 79 301 54 513 
Annual iron 
production 
252.3 million tons 107.6 million tons 359.9 
million 
tons 
TRT Installation rate 95.6% 70% 79.3% 
Installation 
capacity 
1760 MW 747 MW 2507 MW 
Annual 
generation 
capacity 
6055 GWh 2797 GWh 8852 GWh 
 Source: Tsinghua Study, 2009 
 
After many years of re-engineering and re-innovation, SGG and ACEG have started to be 
at the international forefront of TRT technologies. The Blast Furnace Power Recovery Turbine 
(BPRT) invented by SGG, for example, integrates TRT design with a blower system. This 
breakthrough technology greatly simplifies the TRT system and reduces its energy consumption. 
Anyang Steel Plant’s 450 m3 blast furnace has successfully installed the BPRT.  
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The competitive edge of Chinese TRT manufacturers has become a successful model of 
state-led efforts to transfer energy efficiency knowledge in developing countries. However, this 
model didn’t last long and it might not be replicable. In early 2002 Japan discontinued the Green 
Aid Program in China. According to Evans (1999) and Ohshita (2008), the conflicts of interest 
between the Japanese government and Japanese firms were the main cause. MITI relied on the 
private sector to carry out technology transfer efforts. Firms, however, have their own interests: 
maximization of long-term profits.  
 
Summary 
The transfer and deployment of TRT technologies for steel manufacturing in China has 
been a joint effort by the Chinese and Japanese. The TRT case draws attention to the significance 
of international cooperation. Through technology demonstration, especially hands-on training 
and dissemination workshops, the Panzhihua Demonstration Project, jointly led by SDPC and 
MITI, not only provided TRT hardware, but also software to China. The Chinese consequently 
took advantage of this opportunity by increasing the technological absorptive capacities of its 
firms. This included financially supporting Chinese firms’ technology learning, creating a 
domestic market for made-in-China TRT equipments and laying out a national TRT diffusion 
blueprint.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This report examines how low-carbon technologies were introduced, adapted, deployed, 
and diffused in three specific sectors in China: SC/USC coal power generation, wind energy, and 
steel manufacturing. While each case study reflects notable success, perhaps the most striking 
feature is the different approaches they adopted. This should caution against drawing conclusions 
too broadly: these brief case studies cannot be used to draw comprehensive lessons about 
technology deployment systems in China. Nor, given the unique conditions of China, can we 
easily draw lessons that will apply across other countries. Results from other studies also show 
that there is little sign of a single optimum path to success (Lall 1998). Through focusing on key 
policy aspects and programs, however, the report reveals some important building blocks for 
technology deployment. While each sector told a different story, they all suggested a complex 
and iterative process as illustrated below.  
 
To localize core energy technologies, the Chinese government made a deliberate and 
holistic plan for each identified technology. At the early stage of localization, the 863, 973, and 
national Key Technology Programs were the main instruments to support decoding efforts. Once 
a technology has been decoded, a set of incentive policies and regulatory mandates were 
introduced to scale-up commercialization and drive down costs of the technologies. This formula 
has worked to meet the Chinese government’s technology transfer goals but it has also included 
inefficiencies and had reputational impacts.  
 
 
 
 
 
Efficiency in the steel sector 
Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Winter 2011, Vol. 5, No. 4, p59-74                         69  
        Figure 15. China low-carbon technology case studies: technology deployment pipeline 
 
 
 
 
Findings 
• Deployment: China has accelerated domestic low-carbon technology deployment in 
recent decades, making the transition from technology importer to a major manufacturer 
of a number of low-carbon technologies. China’s comprehensive efforts to put in place 
the infrastructure to achieve accelerated deployment and diffusion of the three 
technologies examined in this report illustrate its commitment to becoming a global 
player in the low-carbon economy, as well as to securing a domestic energy supply. 
 
• Role of Domestic Policy: China’s experience highlights the important role of effective 
domestic policy in stimulating low-carbon technology. While the government took 
different approaches for each of the case study technologies, its building blocks for  
technology deployment infrastructure include: 
 
1. Making a deliberate, holistic plan and long-term commitment to the localization 
of a low-carbon technology, as demonstrated in all three cases. 
2. Establishing direct R&D funding programs to support the launch and scale-up of 
low-carbon technology innovation. This approach is especially prominent in the 
case of SC/USC coal-fired power generation technology.  
3. Improving businesses’ technological absorptive capacity through funding 
technology learning and creating domestic markets. The success enjoyed by two 
leading Chinese low-carbon technology companies—Goldwind’s surge in the 
global wind market and Shanxi Glower Group’s dominance of the domestic TRT 
market—are both indebted to this measure.  
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4. Capitalizing on public-private and industry-academia synergies to bring together 
multi-sector expertise. The success of the localization of SC/USC in particular is 
built on such multi-sector synergies. 
5. Designing national-level and sector-wide laws, policies, and regulations to scale-
up commercialization of low-carbon technology and drive down the costs. The 
rapid development of domestic wind energy greatly benefited from such a legal 
and regulatory infrastructure. 
6. Relying on international cooperation to pursue new-to-market technology and 
knowledge. TRT technology’s transfer and deployment resulted from China-
Japan cooperation in the steel sector. 
 
• Technology Transfer and IPR: While Western governments raise IPR with Chinese 
counterparts as one of their principal trade issues, the multinational companies in our 
survey reported that IPR was fairly low on their list of concerns. This is not because the 
problem does not exist, but rather because they use a number of tools to manage it, 
including holding back some of their IPR. This approach, however, is suboptimal for both 
Chinese and international companies.  
 
The SC/USC case study prompted significant IPR concern among international 
companies that their technology was transferred to one company and then re-transferred 
to others. In fact, the technology was first transferred to a state entity, the former State 
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), and the single license then shared with 
multiple companies. It isn’t clear whether the international companies involved 
understood that SETC was acting as the agent for more than a single Chinese company. 
This agreement happened almost thirty years ago, when China was first opening up, so 
confusion on both sides is not surprising. Nevertheless, it is clear that lessons learned 
from that case have increased international companies’ caution and influenced how 
multinationals manage cooperative arrangements and licensing in China. 
 
• In spite of ongoing IPR concerns, many multinational companies benefit from China’s 
huge market. While CE and ABB lost their Chinese market after China started 
manufacturing SC/USC components, Alston, Siemens, Mitsubishi, and Toshiba all 
benefited through selling production licenses to the Chinese SC/USC producers, even if 
they did not do the manufacturing themselves. In the wind industry, Chinese companies 
lack the design capacity to develop cutting-edge turbines and rely exclusively on foreign 
innovations accessed through purchased IPR. When foreign companies can work with 
Chinese partners and stay involved in manufacturing for both the domestic and 
international markets, there is clearly opportunity for a mutually beneficial relationship.  
 
• In essence, in both the SC/USC and the TRT case studies, the Chinese government 
managed the technology transfer on behalf of the Chinese companies involved, and the 
Chinese companies were treated as a cohesive unit rather than as competitors. The 
underlying issue, therefore, is not the nature of Chinese IPR protection, but the nature of 
Chinese contracts, business relationships (both business-to-business and business-to-
government), and trust and transparency, as described in Box 2 in the Introduction.   
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A decade elapsed between the SC/USC and TRT cases. While the latter involved more 
transparency, both appear to have created similar legacies:  
1. The Chinese government viewed these cases as successes and would like to use 
this government-managed model again. 
2. The international companies involved were less convinced of the projects’ success; 
company pressure led to the abandonment of Japanese government-sponsored 
transfers. 
3. Business relationships considered normal outside China, involving private 
contracts and a high degree of trust, were short-circuited in favor of government-
managed solutions that initially produced quicker results. But the government role 
appears to have slowed or restricted later development of these relationships. 
4. International companies typically do not transfer all parts of a technology to 
China, and they often choose to delay deployment. This practice may be 
motivated by IPR, business secrets, or contractual control concerns. 
 
Key messages and lessons learned 
• For Chinese policymakers  
1. China’s comprehensive efforts to put in place the infrastructure to achieve 
accelerated deployment and diffusion of low-carbon technology has been very 
successful. Within 30 years, China has emerged from a pure technology importer 
to a major manufacturer of low-carbon technology. If the same level of effort 
continues, China will soon be a player at the forefront of low-carbon technology 
innovation.  
However, underlying China’s tremendous success are some concerns that need to 
be addressed.  
2. China’s preoccupation with localizing key energy technologies may be viewed by 
foreign companies and governments as going against standard international 
business practices, such as relying on trade to acquire technologies. The global 
wind industry, for example, is a globally integrated industry. China’s ambition to 
localize key wind energy technologies, such as bearing and electric controls, 
leaves China outside the global integration process—a process that can be 
harnessed to reduce the cost of wind technologies by increasing economies of 
scale, fostering competition, and encouraging innovation (Kirkegaard et al. 2009). 
3. In spite of the national government’s effective technology deployment policy, 
China has not yet addressed the pressing issue of deployment of low-quality 
technologies. The low entry barrier for wind energy developers highlighted by the 
case studies, in particular, underscores the importance of setting high technology 
standards at the beginning of technology deployment. 
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4. China’s business sector still has lessons to learn in conducting international 
business negotiations. On the one hand we see government-managed processes in 
the coal and steel sectors that—while effective—may have left some legacy of 
distrust; on the other hand we see the hyper-competitiveness of the wind industry 
with its minimal barriers to entry. Nurturing a more sophisticated business sector 
through market means is a key task for Chinese policymakers seeking to minimize 
costs and barriers and maximize trust and cooperation so as to grow low-carbon 
technology industries. 
• For U.S. policymakers  
1.   China’s ambition is to emerge as a global science and technology power and 
Beijing is keenly aware that the next phase of the science and technology 
revolution will center on clean technology. While the term “indigenous 
innovation” has been interpreted in international policy circles as encompassing a 
very narrow group of government procurement policies, in fact, the policies are 
much more ambitious and involve the kinds of long-term support for RD&D that 
are detailed in these three case studies. 
2.  There are major opportunities for U.S. companies in China’s clean technology 
deployment efforts. The success of Japanese and German companies in the wind 
and power sectors indicates that through joint venture, licensing, or joint design, 
foreign technology providers can benefit from China’s financial resources, 
manufacturing capacity, and enormous market. While China’s ambitious 
localization process for low-carbon technology has raised concerns about 
intellectual property rights in foreign governments and among OECD companies, 
major multinationals surveyed as part of the study did not view IPR as a major 
issue. In the three case studies, the issue was somewhat more ambiguous. There 
did not appear to be any outright IPR violation, but instead different perceptions 
of ownership and contracts have colored some of the arrangements. 
3.  China’s experience highlights the importance of effective domestic policy and 
long-term government commitment. Without clear and lasting signals from the 
government and a central role for government-funded R&D, the market will not 
automatically embrace low-carbon technology. 
• For technology providers  
China’s preference for domestically manufactured technologies can present a competitive 
risk for foreign companies seeking a foothold in China. However, in practice, depending 
on the technology investors’ own conditions and needs, foreign technology providers can 
make a profit through various approaches: 
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1. Joint venture: Benefits include easy access to the Chinese market and freedom 
for foreign companies to use their own business model to sell products. One 
disadvantage is the possibility of leaking intellectual property rights to local 
partners. Because of this drawback, many joint-venture companies in China act as 
manufacturers or post-sale maintenance facilities instead of technology 
developers.  
2. Licensing: Its benefit is guaranteed patent fees and royalties free of concerns 
about the technology users’ business model. The disadvantage is that China’s 
exports might swamp the marketplace and the patent owners only receive a small 
portion of the profit, usually from 3–6% of profits. 
3. Joint design: If technology providers lack manufacturing capacity and financial 
resources, joint design offers good access to China’s financial capitals and 
enormous market. The drawback is that all patent rights are lost to the Chinese 
partner companies. 
4. Wholly foreign owned investment: Benefits include freedom for foreign 
investors to use their own business model and easy access to China’s large skilled 
and relatively inexpensive labor force. For China this is a mechanism for training 
up a workforce in new technologies and related services. The disadvantage for the 
foreign company is that the Chinese government and scholars do not view wholly 
foreign-owned investment activities as a technology transfer mechanism. 
Therefore the foreign investors are less likely to receive administrative or 
financial support from the Chinese government.  
• For other countries who are adapting technology   
Other countries might lack the tremendous scale of resources for domestic investment in 
R&D that China can bring to bear, but China’s experience demonstrates some clear successes 
from which other countries can benefit. These include: the active role of the government in 
pursuing bilateral engagement internationally (in the case of steel); the importance of 
providing clear and lasting signals for low-carbon energy markets (in the case of wind); and 
the central role that government-funded R&D can play (as illustrated by the localization of 
all three technologies).  
The detailed case studies in this report can also inform activities undertaken by the 
international climate technology mechanism. Technology transfer and diffusion throughout 
the developing world will be central tasks for the cooperative mechanism that is established.  
 
However, when reflecting on the lessons that China’s experience brings for technology 
transfer internationally, it is important not to lose sight of China’s unique advantages. The size 
and growth of the Chinese market has meant that foreign companies are prepared to make 
concessions that they may be less willing to entertain in smaller markets. In addition, most 
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developing countries lack the tremendous scale of resources for domestic investment in R&D 
that China can bring to bear. Nevertheless, the active role of the government in pursuing bilateral 
engagement internationally (in the case of steel), the importance of providing clear and lasting 
signals for low-carbon energy markets (in the case of wind) and the central role that government-
funded R&D can play (as illustrated by progress on coal technology) give some clear instances 
of success from which other countries can benefit. Such learning will be critically important to 
efforts to scale-up low-carbon technology deployment around the world to counter climate 
change.  
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